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ABSTRACT 
The role of various stakeholders in the management of natural resources is not 
clear in the West African countries. This paper discusses the historical changes in 
power delegation from central origins to peripheral institutions. The analysis covers 
the rise of bylaws across the Western African countries and links the multiplicity of 
bylaws to the amplification of the decentralization movement. 
On the basis of a literature review and their own practitioners’ experiences, 
the authors demonstrate the pertinence of bylaws as a tool for better management 
of natural resources. In the West African Francophone context, bylaws could stand 
both for regulations enacted by decentralized authorities or “local conventions” 
binding village community groups. Where formal bylaws suffer from limited 
enforcement, local people continue, through their traditional representatives, to 
engage in the negotiation of local conventions for the management of natural 
resources. 
According to the authors, there is a need to recognize local conventions, 
which offer an opportunity for decentralization to be more rooted in local situations. 
Through such conventions, traditional institutions prove their ability to reshape with 
decentralization even if decentralization reforms and national forestry laws have 
ignored them across West Africa.  
Keywords: bylaws, West Africa, natural resource management, decentralization  
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EFFECTIVENESS OF BYLAWS IN THE MANAGEMENT OF NATURAL 
RESOURCES:  
The West African Experience 
Koffi Alinon
1 and Antoine Kalinganire 
INTRODUCTION  
West Africa is an environmentally diverse region that is poor, growing rapidly, and 
losing valuable natural resources. Most West African countries span several eco–
geographical zones including the Saharan desert zone, the Sahelian arid zone, the 
Sudano–Sahelian semi–arid zone, the sub–humid Sudanian zone, and the humid 
Sudano–Guinean and Guinean zone (Niasse et al., 2004). With the exception of 
Ghana, Nigeria, and Côte d’Ivoire, all the West African countries are in the category 
of the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) (UNDP, 2000); population growth ranges 
from 2–3 percent per year. Natural resources are being degraded at very high 
rates, mainly due to several biophysical, socio–economic, and political factors (Allen 
and Barnes, 1985). Deforestation, for example, is driven by the demand for 
agricultural land. Environmental governance, including policies at the national, 
regional, and local level, affects the on–going changes in the management of 
natural resources.  
There is confusion in West Africa regarding rules for access and management 
of land and other natural resources at the local level. The current situation is a 
result of a perpetual misunderstanding between pre–existing customary practices 
and legislative and institutional schemes inherited from Western societies. However, 
beyond this demarcation between public administration and traditional institutions, 
a tendency continues to prevail which consists of “shadow encounters” between 
local formal decentralized authorities and informal entities (for example, villages 
committees). They engage to enact rules that regulate the access and use of 
renewable natural resources and guarantee their peaceful utilization. 
In this paper we argue that recognizing bylaws as one of the most capable 
arrangements in the management of natural resources at a local level is a better 
way to harmonize the ongoing decentralization process with local practices. Our 
discussion supports the idea that the most pertinent level at which natural 
resources must be mastered is the one where all users are at stake. Conservation 
initiatives starting at that level are more likely to succeed than rules and laws 
imposed from the top.  
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BYLAWS AND LOCAL CONVENTIONS: DEFINITIONS AND THEIR ROLE IN 
THE MANAGEMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES IN WEST AFRICA  
It is necessary at an early stage to clarify what is understood by “bylaws” in this 
paper, particularly in the West African Francophone context where bylaws and “local 
conventions” coexist. It is difficult to find a term in French that corresponds to the 
English term “bylaw”. A simple but workable definition comes from Nkonya et al. 
(2005): “Bylaws are subsidiary laws that are enacted by the local governments.” In 
fact, the authors explain that the bodies that enact bylaws go beyond the executive 
sphere and comprise local councils, which have a legislative dimension. Therefore, 
bylaws are enacted at the local level by elected or executive institutions. 
Geographically, the notion of the “local level” is variable. In general, it is lower than 
the national and regional levels and corresponds to the municipal and district size. 
In the Francophone West Africa, municipal councils exist, and, one level 
higher, there is a decentralized institution representing a variable number of towns; 
these are called “Circle councils” (Mali), “Prefecture councils” (Togo), “Province 
councils” (Burkina Faso), or “Department councils” (Niger). Villages have not been 
considered like these decentralized entities, but village chiefs contribute to 
establishing rules in the management of natural resources. Decentralized bodies 
enact “decisions” which have to conform to the provisions in the national 
constitution. The representatives of the central authority (Ministry of Home Affairs), 
who are nominated in each of the decentralized zones, make decisions which are 
called “arêtes,” once these are signed by the representatives. So, in the 
Francophone context bylaws correspond to “decisions” and “arrêtés” emanating 
from municipalities, circles, prefectures, provinces, and departments. 
The decentralization process in Francophone West Africa is in its early stages. 
It started following the collapse of one–party systems in the early 1990s. To date, 
the state has not yet transferred control, including management of land, forestry 
and finance, to the local institutions. Although bylaws enacted at the local level are 
not published, we assume that very few of them concern natural resources 
management since the state maintains its right to establish rules of access to such 
resources.  
In West Africa it is important to consider “local conventions” in the scope of 
bylaws, since these are becoming increasingly important for the management of 
natural resources. According to Dicko (2002), the term “local convention” describes 
all agreements between social groups in order to preserve the environment and 
their own interests. The German Technical Development Cooperation (GTZ, 2005), 
which supported a number of activities concerning those arrangements, defines 
local conventions as “all agreements which encompass an auto–restriction 
dimension in the domain of natural resources’ exploitation with the objective to 
install compatibility between using and renewing these resources.” Hilhorst and 
Coulibaly (1998) introduce the idea of a formal administrative dimension as a 
condition for validity of such conventions and consider them as a form of co–
management between villagers and representatives of the State: “a local 
convention is a contract between villagers and public powers in order to establish 
rules in the management of natural resources.” According to Djire (2003), the local 
convention is “an agreement – written or not – between two or more local actors, 
namely the social groups (socio–professional groups, associations, villages  
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communities or factions), the local administration (State’s representatives or 
decentralized bodies), the technical offices and NGOs, determining rules of access 
and utilization of natural resources for their conservation and sustainable 
exploitation.” 
Through such conventions, traditional institutions (for example, village 
committees) have shown their ability to reshape with decentralization even if they 
had been left aside by decentralization reforms and national forestry laws across 
West Africa.
2  There have been only few exceptions: Ly et al. (2006), for example, 
present a case in Niger where the forestry law recognizes traditional practices of 
agroforestry. The Niger code allows tree management practices, such as thinning 
and pruning, which favor natural regeneration of forests. In this case, the forest law 
is not designed for the static conservation of forests, but allows farmers and 
community based associations to dynamically manage and conserve agroforests in 
their own territory and on their farms. 
When one examines the decentralization process or the modalities of 
enactment of formal conventions, it appears that the state delegates natural 
resources management only to municipalities and prefectures, departments and 
circles, and ignores the traditional and customary structures. But it is at the local 
village level where the effects of natural resource degradation are most apparent. 
Villagers are experiencing a situation where productive land and other natural 
resources are decreasing both quantitatively and qualitatively. This is why various 
strategies were attempted in order to regulate – and even to exclude–access to 
village communities’ resources. However, the enactment of such local conventions 
is not to be considered as a sign of exclusion because all social groups dwelling in 
the village and considered components of the community are due to comply with 
the rules that were agreed upon.
3 
At this stage of the decentralization process, it is regrettable to note that 
local decentralized bodies have no resources to finance their activities apart from 
some donations from the State, NGOs, and international organizations. This is why 
the recognition by their government of their right to regulate and impose taxes and 
fines on the utilization of natural resources is crucial and takes on political 
importance. 
Bylaws are important, therefore, for resource management as they constitute 
an arena of power negotiation between decentralized bodies and traditional 
institutions. In reference to the legal and institutional context of the Sahelian 
countries in West Africa, the local conventions did not formally correspond to 
bylaws. However, a paradigm shift is necessary to see the pertinence of the two 
types of regulation. In this regard, many local conventions serve as framework 
provisions for formal bylaws, and their official recognition by governments would 
have great impact on the management of natural resources in West Africa (Djire, 
2003; GTZ, 2005). 
                                                      
 
2 In Senegal, for example, the Supreme Court has denied Village Chieftaincies the ability to be 
considered as decentralized bodies. 
3 For example, forbidding the cutting of particular tree species applies to the whole village; the 
differences in the rights and responsibilities come into play only in situations with villagers versus 
transhumant populations.  
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COMPARISON OF PAST EXPERIENCES IN NATURAL RESOURCES 
MANAGEMENT IN THE WEST FRANCOPHONE AND ANGLOPHONE AFRICA 
There are some differences in the approach to natural resource management 
between the English and French speaking countries in West Africa. Such differences 
originate from the former colonial powers’ management of their colonies (Phillips, 
1989). Even though the full analysis of the indirect rule in land policy by colonial 
masters is beyond the scope of this paper, we will touch upon the differences in 
their resource governance modes. The British upheld customary land tenure and 
delegated enforcement powers to the chiefs on the basis of their legitimate 
traditional role in regulating local affairs. As the market economy grew, demand for 
land increased and augmented land values. Chiefs and powerful descendants then 
claimed their property rights on the resources by establishing evidence of their 
customary status as landlords. Many authors show the tendency for powerful 
vested actors to interpret traditional rules to their advantage and used them to 
favor their interests. Hobsbawn and Ranger (1983) have described this practice as 
an “invention of tradition.” The ability of social groups to define rules and enforce 
certain types of rights was considerably greater in the Anglophone than in the 
Francophone West Africa. This was due to the practice of “indirect rule” in the 
English speaking countries as opposed to the French custom of direct rule over its 
former colonies. However, the two different approaches adopted by these two 
colonial powers ultimately produced the same prevalence of legal pluralism in the 
newly independent countries. 
The philosophical values that guide the British and the French legal systems 
concerning land access shed some light on the previously discussed differences in 
governance styles. While the French civil legal system is based on the preeminence 
of one basic and valuable right, “droit de propriété,” defines and evaluates all other 
rights. On the other hand, the English common law recognizes the principle of 
divided rights of ownership and the separation of the various rights that apply to 
land. Following the colonization by France and England in West Africa, these two 
legal systems were imposed, and customary laws were denied the status of legal 
authority. In contrast to the French law, the British common law has always allowed 
the opportunity for local rules to regulate practices in certain circumstances. 
However, we must acknowledge the possibility of manipulation by the British in 
some cases in Eastern Africa as noted by McAuslan (2000): “…colonial officials used 
and adapted customary law to suit their own ends; customary law in fact long ago 
ceased to be part of traditional society and became instead part of the colonial 
apparatus of rule.” 
The transition to independence in the Anglophone West Africa altered the 
framework within which property rights were enforced; this concerned the lands 
administrated under the scope of customary law. The chiefs, victorious political 
leaders, and others in the power elite group attempted to redefine the rights of 
access but were not able to restrict the State sovereignty over land. Since then, the 
situation prevailing in the Anglophone countries shifted and appeared quite similar 
to the Francophone scheme because property rights to land and natural resources 
remained virtual and unsecured. Private property rights, state ownership, and 
communal tenure coexisted, inducing legal pluralism, but the new national 
governments enforced none of them effectively. Although different in their  
 
5 
approaches, British and French colonial policies concerning allocation of land and 
natural resources in African societies eventually led to the same result: 
accentuating legal pluralism (Alinon, 2005). The systems of natural resource tenure 
in most West African countries have undergone changes as the original forms of 
tenure by communities have been undermined, although not fatally, by the 
introduction of state or individual private property. 
A brief chronological review of tenure practices points out some common 
features: 
  Prior rules governing access to land and other natural resources 
appeared to be an integral part of social structure, with tenure not 
being separated from social relationships and land use leading to 
certain rights. Individual rights were the fruit of negotiation in which 
the local land authorities acted as referees. 
  Colonization brought a radical change to this institutional 
arrangement. The over– centralization in the Francophone countries 
eliminated the power of the customary authorities and imposed new 
mechanisms (such as public registration) derived from the Napoleonic 
code (or ‘code civil’). The English, on the contrary, had privileged 
indirect rule which mainly strengthened the customary structures in 
land administration but also induced confusion where local chiefs have 
to be created ex nihilo – the colonial administrators being able to 
regulate land through established chieftaincy. 
  Post–colonial independent states nationalized land and tried to 
redefine tenure rights to bring about the development of rural areas. 
All of these different norms co–exist to date. People use the traditional system to 
acquire land and to access resources such as agroforests, forests, and pastures. 
Thereafter, land title is obtained through modern law, by then adding more 
alternatives in putting natural resources into use. The decentralization process 
intends to give resource management back to the elected local institutions. We 
believe that the bylaws generated by these institutions are an opportunity that 
could help to develop a workable natural resources management scheme. 
THE DECENTRALIZATION PROCESS AND THE RISE OF BYLAWS 
Bylaws cannot operate without local bodies which have the ability to ratify them. If 
we consider the institutional origin of bylaws, we can say that bylaws ratified by 
decentralized authorities started to become important with the creation of rural and 
urban municipalities and local governments following the decentralization 
movement by the West African states (see Table 1 for details). 
The decentralization process is still in its early stages. It has moved rapidly 
compared to the democratization of most political regimes in the 1990s. The 
decentralization process across the Francophone and Anglophone countries in West 
Africa is summarized in Table 1. 
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Table 1: Decentralization process in West Africa 
County Year  of 
Decentralization 
Decree name and no.  Observations 
Benin  January 15, 1999  « Loi N° 97–028 portant 





August 6, 1998  « Loi N° 040/98/AN portant 
orientation de la 




October 17, 1980  « Loi N°80–1180 relative à 
l’Organisation Municipale » 
In 1995, another set of 
laws specifying the 







April 17, 2002  The Local Government Act 2002   
Ghana December  24, 
1993 
Local Government Act 1993   
Guinea April  21
st 1990  « Ordonnance N° 
019/PRG/SGG/90 portant 
Formation, Organisation et 
Fonctionnement des Communes 
en République de Guinée » 
The first legislative 
decisions about 
decentralization were a 
set of ordinances in 
1986 
Mali  February 11, 1993  « Loi N° 93–008/ déterminant 
les conditions de la libre 
Administration des Collectivités 
Territoriales » 
 
Mauritania  October 20, 1987  « Ordonnance N° 87–289 
instituant les Communes » 
The political will to 
decentralize became 
more concrete with July 
1993 law (Loi N°93–31) 
Niger  August 10, 2001  « Loi N°2001–23 portant 
création de Circonscriptions 
Administratives et de 
Collectivités Territoriales » 
 
Senegal  March 22, 1996  « Loi N° 96–06 Portant Code 
des Collectivités Locales » 
Senegal has been  
decentralizing since 
1966 (Loi N° 66–64) 
Togo  February 11, 1998  « Loi N° 98–006 portant 
Décentralisation » 
Projected decentralized 
bodies according to the 
1998 law have still not 
been formally created 
In Senegal and Mali, many bylaws address local political and technical issues, 
such as electoral procedures, infrastructure supervisory measures, and so on. In 
some West African countries where the decentralization process has progressed 
more rapidly, there are texts at the local level determining principles for natural 
resource management. In Mali, for example, the ability of local governments to  
 
7 
regulate forest access has been recognized in the provision of the Law n° 96–50 
intended to implement the broad 1995 Forestry Law. Article 11 states: 
"Decentralized territories are responsible for the management, for the organization, 
for the conservation and for the protection of the ecological balance of their 
domain." In the Ségou region of Mali, several bylaws have been annually enacted to 
fix periods for early bushfire, for hunting, to allow animal grazing on farms, and to 
determine the tree species that need to be protected. 
Sow (2005) analyzed the bylaws ratified in Senegal and concluded that the 
decentralization offers technical mechanisms for the emergence of bylaws. He 
found two major factors that could accelerate the enactment of bylaws. First, 
individual municipalities do not have the financial resources to manage local natural 
resources. Secondly, the decentralization law presents a framework that allows the 
merging of several municipalities and the practice of inter–communality. The 
domain covered by the bylaws (ratified by formal decentralized bodies) is very 
limited as it only concerns technical matters and seems disconnected from practices 
on the ground. Those formal bylaws are unknown and ignored by villagers who 
continue to engage in the negotiation of local conventions through their traditional 
representatives.  
Local conventions have also gained influence with the beginning of the 
decentralization reforms. For Djire (2003), the reinforcement of the two processes 
(local conventions and decentralization) is natural as the institutionalization of 
decentralized bodies permitted the emergence of new parties and various actors 
who could sign such conventions. He noted that the geographical area covered by 
the local conventions increased from the village limits to inter–village and regional 
zones. 
Several aspects of natural resource management are often regulated by local 
conventions. Those include management of the village territory (“terroir”), use of 
rural infrastructures, regulation of pastures, forestry, fishing, hunting, and bushfire 
practices. Dicko (2002) has identified 32 local conventions being implemented in 
Mali. Through its projects in West Africa, the GTZ has recognized the existence of 
150 local conventions (GTZ, 2005). Using local conventions as a regulation tool to 
better manage natural resources is then gaining popular support. But as stated 
earlier in the paper, the formal legal foundation of such popular agreements is 
weak. For us, there is room for progressive recognition of local conventions. The 
time has come to begin thinking about the possible interface where legality (formal 
legal basis) will cross legitimacy (popular acceptance of a governing regime or law 
as an authority) for sustainable resource use in West Africa. 
THE BALANCE BETWEEN LEGALITY, LEGITIMACY, AND SOUND ECONOMIC 
PROFITABILITY 
The legality of local conventions has often been questioned. The criticisms refer to 
the fact that the involvement of decentralized bodies as parties to these 
conventions is considered an unnecessary doubling of roles. For legal purists, 
decentralization already offers decentralized bodies the operational tools to 
intervene and to regulate the use of local natural resources. In fact, 
decentralization texts commonly include provisions that allow municipalities, circles, 
prefectures, departments, and provinces to designate responsibility for particular  
 
8 
aspects of the natural resources management to a local entity, such as an 
association, private operator, or village (Dicko, 2002). Although management of 
natural resources is delegated to such entities, the formal bodies continue to 
control the utilization of such resources (Traoré, 1997).  
Another concern about local conventions is the exclusion of people not 
originating from the same area where they were intended to be enforced. In the 
context of the Francophone Unitarian States, local conventions appear like “pockets 
of resistance” to the national unity that supposes the equality of all citizens no 
matter their origin, sex, and social class. Some authors are also skeptical about 
local convention, doubting the self–motivation of the population in freely involving 
themselves in the negotiation and the formulation of such conventions. 
Furthermore, they consider that the involvement of the population is biased by the 
local civil servants and the NGOs that are promoting such conventions. Moreover, 
some aspects of the management of income generated by the regulatory activity 
(for example, taxes and fines) are questionable because effective governance 
schemes are often not planned to back the financial outcomes of the 
implementation of local conventions (Dicko, 2002). 
The opinions reported above consider local conventions more than what such 
agreements were meant to be. The juridical influence on those criticisms is obvious 
as standard and “representative” format applicable to every binding legal 
instrument can often not be detected in the local conventions. However, we must 
stress that local conventions are similar to any new legal order, which is the result 
of confrontation and negotiation between various social forces. They could, 
therefore, be unfair for some social groups. Following the principle of the “social 
working of law” (Griffiths, 1986), local conventions operate within competing 
arenas of influences that attempt to influence the interpretation of the provisions in 
their favor. 
Local conventions operate at the social baseline more so than the formal 
bylaws. Their legitimacy is, therefore, recognized by the stakeholders, and, in terms 
of peaceful enforcement, only this legitimacy matters. In situations of legal 
imbroglio, specialists in legal anthropology often call for reconciliation and “a 
correlation between legality and legitimacy, which could be materialized through 
various forms and occasions” (Rochegude, 2001). The practice on the ground tends 
progressively to bridge the gap: for example, some decentralized bodies in the 
Malian case are taking the provisions of local conventions as the basis for the 
formulation of formal bylaws (Djire, 2003). 
The economic impact of bylaws is not to be neglected when it comes to 
addressing the problems of sustainable resource use and poverty alleviation. The 
benefits of enforcing such legal instruments flow from the income and the economic 
returns that derive from their application (fines or payments for permits). For 
example, decentralized bodies and local communities could earn significant revenue 
by applying the rules and regulations related to the access and the utilization of 
forestry resources. A GTZ (2005) report reveals the case of 17 rural communities in 
Senegal that protected about 27,000 ha of forest and sold the forest products four 
years later, earning 50 million FCFA (French West African francs), which is 
approximately US$95,000. By achieving the balance between income generation 
and natural resources preservation, bylaws and particularly the local conventions 
contribute to meeting one of the prerequisites for natural resources sustainability.  
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CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH AND PRACTICE 
There is growing awareness in West Africa of the need to strengthen partnerships 
between governments and rural communities for the management of natural 
resources. Moreover, these changes are occurring in several dimensions. Granting 
people the right to manage their resources locally constitutes a starting point, 
which likely strengthens democracy, participation, and active empowerment of the 
population in the process of sustainable economic and social development. While 
the opportunities seem promising, it is important that we consider how bylaws can 
impact efforts deployed in the management of natural resources. 
Generally, as stated by Swallow et al. (2006), formal authority is shifting 
from the national forestry agencies to decentralized multi–stakeholder communities 
and local user groups. Rules and prohibitions are gradually being augmented by 
incentive– and market–based approaches to environmental management. However, 
various forest and land related texts (and bylaws) in legislation in the Sahel do not 
sufficiently take into account the agroforestry systems within the framework of the 
written formal law (Ly et al., 2006).  
The present situation does not favor the management of forests. Policy 
practices that promote better management should prioritize opportunities by which 
West Africa’s natural resources could benefit from a suitable arrangement or 
framework. Positive steps are being made in the on–going decentralization of 
natural resource management and in the encouragement of local communities and 
administrative units to play an active role in the management of their own natural 
assets. There are also local conventions, customary practices, and regulations 
dealing natural resources management activities that should be acknowledged by 
West African governments. Lavigne–Delville (2004) reveals that: “All recent 
analyses in fact show that local arrangements remain very fragile unless they are 
given legal and administrative recognition. Even when rules are shared and 
recognized within the community concerned, they have no validity vis–à–vis third 
parties in the event of conflicts, whether these are internal to the group or external 
(herds passing through, encroachment by urban dwellers, charcoal–makers, and so 
on). At present, such recognition is entirely dependent on the goodwill of the 
administrative authorities or technical services, and is therefore extremely fragile.” 
As we demonstrated in this paper, various environmental, economic, and 
social outcomes are likely to arise from this recognition. There are important 
research issues to be addressed and reflections to be done on the best strategy by 
which to render local bylaws more effective, particularly in the situations where 
official legislation has begun to restore a place for local natural resources 
management. For example, in the case of Niger, there is a need to document the 
condition of efficiency of the forestry law at a local level in regard to the articulation 
between various organizations (state, chiefs, NGOs) and institutional constructions 
created in the last decade (lands commissions, decentralized authorities, villages 
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